• Home
  • About Me
  • Disclaimer

The Researching Paralegal

~ Articles and Research for Legal Professionals

The Researching Paralegal

Category Archives: Appellate Law

Preserving Issues On Appeal.

11 Wednesday Mar 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Appellate Record

≈ Comments Off on Preserving Issues On Appeal.

Tags

Appellate Law, Appellate Record, Black's Law Dictionary, Louisiana Civil Appeals Blog, Raymond P. Ward

Series Of Posts On Preserving Issues For Appeal, by Raymond P. Ward, Louisiana Civil Appeals

http://raymondpward.typepad.com/la-appellate/2015/03/series-of-posts-on-preserving-issues-for-appeal.html

The first of Mr. Ward’s series on this subject. -CCE

Monday’ blog post reminded me of some materials I’ve accumulated on preserving errors for review in Louisiana state courts. Recently I shared those materials with a colleague, who suggested writing an article about the topic. I decided instead to self-publish a series of posts here on preservation of error. I figured that breaking down the topic into a series of short blog posts and self-publishing them would be easier than trying to write one big lengthy article and then shopping for a publisher.

Let’s begin by defining preservation of error. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as ‘the taking of all steps necessary under the rules of procedure or at common law in bringing an improper act or statement to the trial court’s attention so that, if not corrected, the mistake can be reviewed on appeal.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 10th ed.,Thomson Reuters 2014). In Louisiana, substitute Code of Civil Procedure for rules of procedure, and substitute case law or jurisprudence for common law. This definition is reflected in La. Ct. App. Unif. R. 1-3, under which the court of appeal ‘will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court ….’

But why must an error in the trial court be brought to the trial court’s attention before it can be argued in the court of appeal? The next few posts will answer that question.

 

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

How A Dental Board Decision Could Affect The Business of Practicing Law.

07 Saturday Mar 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Federal Trade Commission, Government, Legal Ethics, Paralegals/Legal Assistants, Rules of Professional Responsibility, Supervising Support Staff, Unauthorized Practice of Law, United States Supreme Court

≈ Comments Off on How A Dental Board Decision Could Affect The Business of Practicing Law.

Tags

Anti-trust, Board of Dental Examiners, Federal Trade Commission, Forbes, Ken Friedman, LegalZoom Inc., Monopoly, Non-Lawyers, Unauthorized Practice of Law

Could Dental-Board Decision Unlock Lawyer Control Of State Bar Regulations?, guest post Ken Friedman, Forbes

(Mr. Friedman is the Vice President of Legal and Government Affairs for LegalZoom Inc.)

http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/03/04/dental-board-decision-could-unlock-lawyer-control/

Many state regulatory agencies are controlled by active members of the very professions they oversee. Last week, this fox-and-hen-house scenario was addressed by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that such agencies are not immune to federal antitrust laws unless their actions are actively supervised by politically accountable government officials. While the case dealt specifically with dentistry (teeth whiteners everywhere, rejoice!), the ruling will have far broader ramifications for many professions, including how the practice of law is regulated.

In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the FTC’s ruling that the Dental Examiners violated antitrust laws when they sent dozens of ‘cease and desist’ letters to teeth whiteners, claiming that they were engaged in the ‘unauthorized practice of dentistry.’ The letters and other strong-arm tactics worked – dentists in North Carolina established a monopoly over teeth-whitening services until the FTC intervened.

The Dental Examiners monopolistic campaign was modeled after a similar, if less successful, campaign engaged by the North Carolina State Bar.

The Supreme Court’s decision will have broad positive effects throughout the country. The Court’s ruling recognizes that letting professionals enforce their own monopolies creates a ‘real danger’ that they will act to further their ‘own interests,’ rather than the public interest. These practices increase prices to the detriment of consumers while decreasing consumer choice. The Court recognized that the problem is far worse when the boundaries of the state-granted monopoly are not ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,’ and the professionals are given the power to decide what is the ‘unauthorized practice’ of their profession.

This lack of clarity is not uncommon. For example, Rhode Island opens the door to this defining the unauthorized practice of law as the ‘doing of any act for another person usually done by attorneys at law in the course of their profession.’ They list a few examples, ‘without limiting the generality of the definitions.’

The active supervision concept is important. While the requirement is ‘flexible and context-dependent,’ the Court made clear that the ‘supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it.’ The supervisor cannot be a market participant and needs to have the power to veto or modify decisions. This will require significant interaction.

Regulating the practice of law is the classic example of active market participants protecting their monopoly. In its amicus brief, the NCSB states that its authority is vested in the State Bar Council, 65 of whose 68 members are lawyers.

The threat this poses is not idle. . . .

Continue reading →

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Can You Use iPads or iPhones in Court? Maybe – Maybe Not.

03 Tuesday Mar 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, Android Phones, Appellate Law, Apple, Blackberry Phones, Cell Phones, Court Rules, Courts, Federal District Court Rules, iPad, iPhones, Laptop, Legal Technology, Local Rules, Oral Argument

≈ Comments Off on Can You Use iPads or iPhones in Court? Maybe – Maybe Not.

Tags

Court Rules, iPads, iPhone J.D. Blog, iPhones, Jeff Richardson, Legal Technology & Tips

Court Rules on iPhone, iPad Use, by Jeff Richardson, iPhone J.D. Blog (with hat tip to Ray Ward, Louisiana Civil Appeals Blog)

http://www.iphonejd.com/iphone_jd/2015/03/court-rules.html

If there are rules for or against using any type of technology in a courtroom, you will normally find the court’s preference in its local rules. Courts don’t write local rules just for fun. They mean it when they say they don’t like something. If your court clearly states in its local rules that certain types of technology are not tolerated, don’t temp fate by assuming that you will be the exception.

Please note the comments at the end of the article. There is more valuable information about other court rules. -CCE

There are countless ways that an iPhone and iPad can be useful to an attorney while in court — whether you are at counsel table or just monitoring proceedings from the cheap seats in back. I often use my iPhone to look up a statute, check my calendar, get some information from an email, or remind myself of the name of another attorney in the courtroom. I often use my iPad to look at a case cited by an opponent, review the key part of an exhibit or transcript, or take notes. But you cannot do any of this unless the court lets you use electronic devices in the courtroom. I remember a time many years ago when the Eastern District of Louisiana did not allow any cell phones, even if turned off, and if my Palm Treo was still in my pocket, I had to walk back to my office, a few blocks away, and leave it there. Many courts are now more lenient, but attorneys should not just assume that it is okay to plan to use an iPhone and iPad in court. Instead, it is wise to first determine if there is an applicable court rule on the issue.

I write about this today because Ray Ward, an appellate attorney at my law firm, has a case that is soon set for oral argument before the U.S. Fifth Circuit, and in connection with that case, yesterday he received a notice from the Fifth Circuit of a new policy on electronic devices in the courtroom. Ray wrote about the notice (and attached a copy) in this post on his Louisiana Civil Appeals blog. In short, you can now have an iPhone or iPad in the courtroom, but it must be turned off unless you are presenting argument or at counsel table. And even then, you cannot take pictures or video, nor can you use social media. . . .

Continue reading →

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Drugs Found During Search of Luggage. Was Consent Sufficient?

22 Thursday Jan 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, Appellate Law, Civil Rights, Fourth Amendment - Search & Seizure

≈ Comments Off on Drugs Found During Search of Luggage. Was Consent Sufficient?

Tags

Consent for Search, Fifth Circuit Blog, Kristin Connor, Search & Seizure, Traffic Stop

Driver on Cross-Country Trip Did Not Have Authority to Consent to Search Passengers’ Luggage in Trunk, by Kristin Connor, Fifth Circuit Blog

http://circuit5.blogspot.com/2014/10/driver-on-cross-country-trip-did-not.html

United States v. Iraheta, No. 13-30545 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2014) (Stewart, Dennis, Gilstrap)

The panel affirms suppression of drugs found during a traffic stop in Louisiana. The car with a California license plate was occupied by three people on a cross-country trip from California to Miami. Out of the hearing of the other two occupants, the officers asked Iraheta for consent to search the car, and he consented. Based on this consent, the officers searched the luggage in the truck and found drugs in one of the bags.

Typically, consent to search a vehicle applies to any unlocked containers within it. However, ‘[t]he sole fact that luggage is located in a car’s trunk is insufficient to show joint control over those items.’ ‘Iraheta clearly did not have actual authority to consent to the search of multiple pieces of luggage in the trunk of a vehicle occupied by him and two passengers.’ The officers were on notice of this because the car was occupied by three people on a cross-country roadtrip and there were multiple unmarked bags in the trunk.

While the defendants did not object to the search or assert ownership of the bags, the panel found this not to be determinative, particularly since the other defendants did not hear Iraheta consent and were not informed about it. Furthermore, the defendants had standing to challenge the search because they did not abandon the bag prior to the search.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Tax Time Is Coming – Again.

19 Monday Jan 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, State Appellate Courts, Tax Law

≈ Comments Off on Tax Time Is Coming – Again.

Tags

Accounting, Federal Taxes, IRS, Payroll Deductions, Retirement Taxes, Self-Employment Tax, State Taxes, Tax Law, U.S. Tax Court

A new year. New tax laws. Regardless of whether you do your own taxes or use a trusty accountant, it’s time to start getting your ducks in a row. -CCE

Bankrate – Tax Laws and the IRS
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/taxes/tax-law.aspx
Calculator for all types of things: taxes, payroll deductions, self-employment taxes, retirement plan tax deductions, and 125 cafeteria plans.

Income Tax – Cornell Legal Information Institution
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/income_tax
Federal statutes, regulations, U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Circuit Courts, and U.S. Tax Court cases, and references to other sources.

TaxCites.com
http://www.taxsites.com/
Tax, Accounting and Payroll Sites Directory

IRS – Tax Law Questions
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Law-Questions

Tax Law: Guide to Taxation Law
http://www.hg.org/tax.html

IRS – Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance
http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Tax-Code,-Regulations-and-Official-Guidance

TaxProfBlog
http://taxprof.typepad.com/

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

The Right Way to Assemble Attachments To Appellate Supervisory Writs.

17 Saturday Jan 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Appellate Writing, Legal Writing, Louisiana Supreme Court, Readability

≈ Comments Off on The Right Way to Assemble Attachments To Appellate Supervisory Writs.

Tags

Appellate Law, Appellate Procedure, Appellate Writs, Legal Writing, Louisiana Civil Appeals, Raymond P. Ward

Practical Tip For Assembling A Writ Application, by Raymond P. Ward, Louisiana Civil Appeals

http://tinyurl.com/o2or5jy

Today [January 14. 2015] I started working on an application to the court of appeal for a supervisory writ, and was reminded of my # 1 tip for this task: the first thing you do—before you write a word—is assemble the attachments. Uniform Rule 4-5 lists the attachments that must be included. I like to put them all together and give them provisional page numbers before I start writing the application itself, starting with A1, A2, etc. If your attachments are in PDF (if they’re not, they should be), putting them together and page-numbering them is a snap with Adobe Acrobat or other PDF-handling software.

Assembling the appendix on the front end has at least two advantages. First, when you draft the writ application, you can include pinpoint citations to items in the appendix. Second, you find out immediately if you’re missing something that you need (such as the hearing transcript).

There is one little hitch to my system: Uniform Rule 4-5(B) requires all pages of the application, including the application itself and all attachments, to be consecutively numbered. And if you don’t know how long the application itself will be until you write it, you don’t know until the end of the process the number of the first page of the attachments. But this problem is easy to solve. Once the application is in almost-final form, you know how long it will be. If it’s 25 pages, you know that the number of the first page of attachments will be 26. So when I’m finalizing, say, a 25-page application, I just add 25 to all my “An” citations to the attachments and remove the “A”. A1 becomes 26, A2 becomes 27, etc. Is this time-consuming? A bit. But not nearly as time-consuming as trying to fill in totally blank citations to the attachments.

Which leads to another tip: when, in writing a writ application, you cite one of the attachments, cite it by its consecutive-page number. If it’s a multi-volume writ application, cite by volume and page number. Example: “See writ app. vol. 2 p. 301.” Your job as the writer is to make it as easy as possible for the reader to locate what you’re citing. So give the reader the information needed to instantly locate whatever it is you’re citing.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Law Changes For Juvenile Sex Offenders.

04 Sunday Jan 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Child Molestation, Criminal Law, Criminal Records, Juveniles, Pennsylvania Superior Court, Sex Offender Registry, Sexual Assault

≈ Comments Off on Law Changes For Juvenile Sex Offenders.

Tags

Commerce Clause, Juveniles, Megan's Law Registry, Sex Offender Registry, Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Ac

Pennsylvania Top Court Strikes Down Law On Juvenile Sex Offenders, by Allison Sacriponte, JURIST Blog

http://tinyurl.com/l299xsy

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court [official website] ruled [opinion, PDF] 5-1 last week that the requirement that all sex offenders who were juveniles at the time of their crimes must remain on the Megan’s Law Registry for life is unconstitutional. The court upheld a 2013 decision by a York County judge that struck down portions of the Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) [text; JURIST news archive]. The court declared the law unconstitutional because it allowed no appeal and assumed that all juvenile sex offenders posed a high risk of committing crimes as adults, even though according to studies, barely one percent of them commit new crimes. In addition to public contempt, being on the Megan’s Law Registry required offenders to report quarterly to state police and report changes of address, job or personal appearance within three days.

In June 2013 the US Supreme Court [official website] ruled [JURIST report] that the federal government can compel a convicted sex offender to register with the SORNA even if the offender completed his sentence before SORNA was enacted. In February 2009 a judge in the US District Court for the Eastern District of California [official website] held that the statute violates the Commerce Clause [text] of the US Constitution by making it a federal crime for a sex offender to move to another state while failing to register in a nationwide database. Sex offender laws have been increasingly criticized [JURIST report] for limiting residence options and promoting ostracization.

 

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

What States And U.S. Supreme Court May Rule On Abortion In 2015.

01 Thursday Jan 2015

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, United States Supreme Court

≈ Comments Off on What States And U.S. Supreme Court May Rule On Abortion In 2015.

Tags

Abortion, Jennifer Luden, NPR, State Laws on Abortion, U.S. Supreme Court

Big Question For 2015: Will The Supreme Court Rule On Abortion?, by Jennifer Luden, NPR

http://tinyurl.com/ktmqead

The new year is expected to bring yet another round of state laws to restrict abortion — and 2015 could also be the year a challenge to at least one of these laws could reach the Supreme Court.

The ongoing spike in abortion laws started after 2010, when Republicans won big in the midterms. Since then, state lawmakers have passed more than 200 abortion regulations — more than in the entire decade before. And with more statehouse gains in the fall elections, abortion opponents expect another good year.

The Two-Way

Supreme Court Blocks Abortion Rules That Closed Most Texas Clinics

‘The two states that stand out is where we are now able to stop bad legislation from happening,’ says Mary Spaulding Balch, state legislative director of the National Right to Life Committee. ‘It looks like we have a pro-life majority in the Senate in the state of New York, which could prevent a bill that Gov. Cuomo was pushing that would have expanded abortion in New York, if you can imagine.’

The same political calculus goes for Washington state, Balch says.

Then there’s Tennessee, where a new constitutional amendment denies any right to abortion. That’s expected to clear the way for a string of regulations courts previously had struck down. . . .

 

 

 

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Scathing Report on Arizona’s Criminal Justice System.

14 Sunday Dec 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Arizona Court of Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence, Justice Reform, Murder

≈ Comments Off on Scathing Report on Arizona’s Criminal Justice System.

Tags

Arizona Court of Appeals, Bob Christie, Criminal Justice System, Criminal Law, Criminal Prosecutor, Debra Jean Milke, Evidence, Huff Post Crime, Jacques Billeaud

Case Tossed Vs. Debra Jean Milke, Woman Held 22 Years In Son’s Death, by Jacques Billeaud and Bob Christie, Huff Post Crime

http://tinyurl.com/ogkwpc5

In a scathing critique of Arizona’s criminal justice system, a state appeals court on Thursday ordered the dismissal of murder charges against a woman who spent 22 years on death row for the killing of her 4-year-old son.

The Arizona Court of Appeals leveled harsh criticism against prosecutors over their failure to turn over evidence during Debra Jean Milke’s trial about a detective with a long history of misconduct and lying. The court called prosecutors’ actions ‘a severe stain on the Arizona justice system.’

A three-judge panel of the appeals court said it agreed with Milke’s argument that a retrial would amount to double jeopardy.

The failure to disclose the evidence ‘calls into question the integrity of the system and was highly prejudicial to Milke,’ the court wrote. ‘In these circumstances — which will hopefully remain unique in the history of Arizona law — the most potent constitutional remedy is required.’ . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Changes to Federal Rules Effective December 1, 2014.

02 Tuesday Dec 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Bankruptcy Law, Civil Procedure, Court Rules, Courts, Criminal Law, Evidence, Federal Civil Procedure

≈ Comments Off on Changes to Federal Rules Effective December 1, 2014.

Tags

Bankruptcy Rules, Federal Appellate Rules, Federal Court Rules, Federal Criminal Rules, Federal Evidence Rules, United States Courts

Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, United States Courts (with hat tip to Andrea Duncan, RP!)

http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/current-rules.aspx

The following rules became effective December 1, 2014:

Appellate Rule 6 (doc) (pdf)

  • Doc. 113-161 – Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (pdf)

Bankruptcy Rules 1014, 7004, 7008, 7054, 9023, and 9024 (doc) (pdf), and 8001-8028 (“Part VIII Rules”) (doc) (pdf)

  • Doc. 113-165 – Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (pdf)

Civil Rule 77 (doc) (pdf)

  • Doc. 113-163 – Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pdf)

Criminal Rules 5, 6, 12, 34, and 58 (doc) (pdf)

  • Doc. 113-162 – Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (pdf)

Evidence Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and 803(6)–(8) (doc) (pdf)

  • Doc. 113-164 – Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence (pdf)

 

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Contracts Must Be Drafted With Specific Language To Enforce Arbitration.

01 Monday Dec 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, Appellate Law, Arbitration, Arbitration, Breach, Contract Law, Employment Law, Legal Analysis, Legal Writing, Precedent

≈ Comments Off on Contracts Must Be Drafted With Specific Language To Enforce Arbitration.

Tags

Arbitration, Breach of Contract, Contract Law, Legal Writing, Lexology, Liz Kramer, Stinson Leonard Street LLP

“Harmonizing” Contract Language Leads Two Circuit Courts To Deny Arbitration, by Arbitration Nation Blog, posted at Lexology Blog

http://tinyurl.com/mh3y6z3

Two parties recently convinced federal circuit courts that the language of their arbitration agreements was not sufficient to compel arbitration of their disputes. Both cases turned on how courts ‘harmonize’ language from different parts of an agreement or from multiple agreements.

The decision from the Eighth Circuit was a pretty easy one. The parties’ contract required them to mediate any dispute. Then it said: ‘if the dispute is not resolved through mediation, the parties may submit the controversy or claim to Arbitration. If the parties agree to arbitration, the following will apply…’ The party fighting arbitration (a city in South Dakota) argued the quoted language does not mandate arbitration, it makes arbitration an option for the parties, so the case should remain in court. [Emphasis in original.]

The party seeking arbitration emphasized a sentence at the end of the arbitration paragraph saying that the arbitrator’s ‘decision shall be a condition precedent to any right of legal action.’ It argued that the only way to harmonize that language is to conclude that arbitration is required. The court disagreed, finding that a reasonable interpretation is simply that if the parties decided to arbitrate, the arbitration decision is a condition precedent to further legal action. Quam Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Redfield, ___ F.3d___, 2014 WL 5334781 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration.

The Fifth Circuit had a harder case in Sharpe v. AmeriPlan Corp., __ F.3d__, 2014 WL 5293707 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). In that case, three former sales directors of a company sued for breach of contract after they were terminated. The company moved to compel arbitration and the district court granted the motion.

Their original employment agreements with the company did not call for arbitration, in fact they set the venue for legal proceedings exclusively in Texas courts. The employment agreements also incorporated a ‘Policies and Procedures Manual.’ The employment agreements could only be modified with written consent of all parties, but the Manual could be unilaterally modified by the company. Years later, the company amended its Manual to provide for mandatory arbitration.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the new arbitration clause was unenforceable. First, the court concluded that the jurisdiction and venue clauses in the original employment agreements survived the amendment to the Manual, because there was no written and signed change to the employment agreements themselves and because the company had affirmatively relied on the venue clause (calling for Texas courts) when it transferred the case from California to Texas. And second, the court found that the old and new provisions “cannot be harmonized” without rendering the original agreement meaningless.

There are drafting lessons from these cases: if you want to have mandatory arbitration of disputes, the contract must consistently say that, and if you want to modify existing agreements to add arbitration, make sure to honor any language in the original agreement about how that agreement can be amended or modified and be clear what clauses are replaced or superseded.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Appellate Legal Writing – This Is How You Do It.

27 Thursday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Appellate Writing, Brief Writing, Editing, Legal Analysis, Legal Argument, Legal Writing, Legalese, Plain Language, Proofreading, Propositions and Headings, Readability, Statement of Facts, Summary of the Argument, Table of Authorities

≈ Comments Off on Appellate Legal Writing – This Is How You Do It.

Tags

A Writ In Time, Appellate Writing, Bridging the Gap Seminar, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, Free CLE Materials and Forms, Legal Writing, Louisiana Civil Appeals Blog, Moot Court, Raymond P. Ward, the (new) legal writer blog

Free La. Appellate CLE Materials, by Raymond P. Ward, Louisiana Civil Appeals Blog

http://tinyurl.com/mg88sy7

Here’s something you don’t see everyday – a top-notch lawyer generously sharing everything juicy in his CLE presentation.  I am a long-time follower of Mr. Ward’s blogs. I strongly recommend this blog, as well as his other blog, the [new] legal writer blog at http://raymondpward.typepad.com/newlegalwriter/. 

Notice how the propositions further the appellate brief’s argument to the court. They are not simply “The Court Should Grant Summary Judgment to Plaintiff” or something equally bland.  Likewise, the propositions are not more than one sentence.

The Statement of the Case is less than one page. The writer doesn’t bog the Court down with unnecessary facts. You can look, but you will not find even a whiff of legalese.

Please pay attention when you read the materials and each sample document (thank you for including them!). Notice that no words are wasted. There is a reason why.

Notice the word choice, the size of the sentences and paragraphs, and the crafting of the propositions and subheadings. The persuasive argument is easy to follow. The writer keeps the reader’s attention – an absolute must for anything you write.

Do you aspire to be a good writer? Write like this. -CCE

This morning [October 28, 2014], I presented an hour of CLE on appellate practice for the Louisiana State Bar Association’s ‘Bridging the Gap’ seminar, a program for newly minted lawyers who passed the February 2014 bar exam. For attendees and anyone else who may be interested, here are some supplemental materials used or discussed in the presentation:

  • My written materials
  • A PDF copy of my PowerPoint presentation
  • My article A Writ in Time, 51 La. B.J. 338 (Feb.–Mar. 2004)
  • Two entertaining and informative articles by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Ninth Circuit:
    • In Praise of Moot Court—Not!, in which Judge Kozinski discusses the differences between law-school moot-court competitions and real-world appellate practice
    • The Wrong Stuff, in which Judge Kozinski offers tips to help you lose your next appeal

For reasons discussed at the seminar and elsewhere, I recommend against over-reliance on forms. With that caution stated—and with no warranties—I offer some samples of pleadings and briefs, all in PDF:

  • Notice of intent to seek a supervisory writ

  • Application for a supervisory writ

  • Request for oral argument

  • Brief (La. court of appeal)

  • La. Supreme Court writ application

  • La. Supreme Court merits brief

  • US 5th Circuit brief

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Justice Scalia’s Interpretation of Criminal Statutes And “Rule of Lenity.”

22 Saturday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Civil Rights, Constitutions, Criminal Law, Federal Law, Federal Sentencing, Fourth Amendment - Search & Seizure, Law Enforcement, Research, Statutes, United States Supreme Court, White Collar Crime

≈ Comments Off on Justice Scalia’s Interpretation of Criminal Statutes And “Rule of Lenity.”

Tags

Above the Law (blog), Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Federal Criminal Statutes, Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia, Matt Kaiser, Rule of Lenity, White Collar Crime

Scalia Weighs In On One of the Most Important Questions in the World of White-Collar Criminal Defense, by Matt Kaiser, Above The Law Blog

http://tinyurl.com/kahbnvm

Justice Scalia is not a man known for mild opinions. I hear the other Justices have voted him ‘least likely to say ‘this is a question on which reasonable minds could disagree.’

While a conservative, Scalia has done good work for those charged in criminal cases in recent years. He’s been good on Fourth Amendment issues, the Confrontation Clause, and federal sentencing.

And, at oral argument recently, on what is perhaps the most significant criminal justice issue of the day — how broadly we should interpret criminal statutes — Scalia has turned his considerable intellect again in a defense-friendly way.

How, you ask?

Whether to interpret a criminal statute broadly or narrowly is an intricate question. The ‘Rule of Lenity says that criminal statutes should be interpreted narrowly. Yet courts often read in a meta-‘Rule of Lenity’ that says that the Rule of Lenity itself should be interpreted narrowly.

Moreover, judicial review of the scope of a criminal statute is tricky. There are thousands of federal criminal statutes on the books and Congress makes more every year. About 95% of the time, people charged with federal crimes plead guilty. Courts are highly resistant to litigate the meaning and breadth of a federal criminal statute before trial, which means that challenges to the interpretation of a statute are possible in a very small number of cases.

What that means is that prosecutors’ interpretations of federal statutes are highly unlikely to be meaningfully challenged. And, when they are, generally they are interpreted broadly. . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Illinois Pension Law Ruled Unconstitutional.

22 Saturday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Bankruptcy Law, Employment Law, Illinois Supreme Court, Pension Rights

≈ Comments Off on Illinois Pension Law Ruled Unconstitutional.

Tags

Bankruptcy, Constitution Law, Detroit, Employment Law, JPMorgan, JURIST, Municipal Debt, Pension Rights

Judge Rules Illinois Pension Law Unconstitutional, by Elizabeth LaForgia, JURIST (Supported by the University of Pittsburg School of Law)

http://tinyurl.com/oppjhg8

An Illinois judge on Friday ruled [opinion, PDF] a law intended to fix the pension crisis in the state violates the Illinois constitution. Sangamon Country Circuit [official website] Judge John Belz ruled in favor of state employees and retirees who sued to block the law. Last December, state lawmakers passed [JURIST report] the bill [text, PDF], which amended the state’s pension plan in an effort to cut spending and lower the state’s debt. The law would raise the retirement age and lower annual increases in pensions to retired employees, which would be based on the number of years worked. Public employee unions challenged the measure under the Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution [materials], arguing that the constitution prohibits reducing benefits or compensation. In response, the state argued that pensions can be modified in times of fiscal emergency. ‘The state of Illinois made a constitutionally protected promise to its employees concerning their pension benefits,’ wrote Judge Belz. ‘Under established and uncontroverted Illinois law, the state of Illinois cannot break this promise. Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan [official website] announced [statement] that they “plan to immediately appeal the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court.’

Pension rights have been a controversial issue recently. In December, a judge for the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan [official website] ruled [JURIST report] that the city of Detroit is eligible for bankruptcy [JURIST op-ed]. The insolvent city’s debt [JURIST op-ed] includes 3.5 billion dollars in pension funds. The bankruptcy was allowed to go forward despite a Michigan state court ruling [JURIST report] last year which held that the city’s filing for bankruptcy violated the Michigan Constitution. The bankruptcy court held that the pension funds could not be treated any differently than other unsecured debt. In March 2013 the US District Court for the Southern District of New York [official website] denied [JURIST report] a motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a pension plan holder against JPMorgan (JPM) [corporate website; JURIST news archive]. The court found that sufficient allegations were raised to support a claim for breaches of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Collection of Judges’ Best Advice On Legal Writing.

08 Saturday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, Appellate Law, Appellate Writing, Bad Legal Writing, District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Editing, Legal Argument, Legal Writing, Legalese, Oregon Supreme Court, Plain Language, Readability, Texas Supreme Court, United States Supreme Court, Wisconsin Supreme Court

≈ Comments Off on Collection of Judges’ Best Advice On Legal Writing.

Tags

Appellate Brief Writing, Bryan A. Garner, Joseph Kimble, Legal Writing, Legalese, Michigan Bar Association, Plain Language

Judges on Effective Writing: The Importance of Plain Language, by Bryan A. Garner, Vol 84 Mich. B. J. 44 (February 2005)

http://tinyurl.com/kk6trum

Each quote here is a pearl of wisdom – classical and timeless. Look no further to find the heart and soul of effective legal writing. Click on the hyperlink to find the footnotes for each quotation. -CCE

I trust that, after more than 20 years, some of the Plain Language columns are worth reprinting. This one appeared in March 1994. As I noted then, the survey that Mr. Garner mentions in his introduction is the same one that we first did in Michigan, with very similar results. See the October 1987 and May 1990 columns. The judges are identified by their judicial positions when they make their remarks. —JK (Joseph Kimble)

Lawyers are notoriously poor at gauging what judges prefer in legal writing. Too many of us believe, for example, that judges expect us to use legalese. In 1991, when the Texas Plain-Language Committee surveyed all the state district and appellate judges in Texas, we found that more than 80 percent prefer plain language (Plaintiff complains of Defendant and says) over legalese (Now comes the Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys of record, Darrow and Holmes, and for his Original Petition in this cause would respectfully show unto the Court the following). Indeed, several judges responded to the survey with a plea that we stamp out legalese once and for all.

The results of that survey surprised many Texas litigators—and many changed the form of their court papers. But many more have persisted in the old, legalistic style—perhaps out of a fondness akin to what some people feel for the language of the King James Version of the Bible. Judge Lynn Hughes of Houston speaks directly to those litigators: ‘Anyone who thinks Comes now the Plaintiff is anything like the King James Version has no sense of poetry.’

Literary tastes may differ, of course, but it’s worth knowing what judges say—and have been saying for a long time—about the language we lawyers use. Following are some choice quotations I’ve recently collected. —Bryan A. Garner

Judicial Diagnoses

‘Lawyers spend a great deal of their time shoveling smoke.’ Hon. Oliver Wendell Holmes1, U.S. Supreme Court

‘[Too many lawyers believe that] it is essential to legal English that one write as pompously as possible, using words and phrases that have long since disappeared from normal English discourse.’ Hon. Antonin Scalia2 , U.S. Supreme Court

‘The reason legal writing has gotten to such a low point is that we have had very bad teachers—judges who wrote years ago and wrote badly. We learned bad habits from them and their opinions in law school.’
Hon. William Bablitch3, Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Stick to the Mother Tongue

‘[The advocate] will stock the arsenal of his mind with tested dialectical weapons. He will master the short Saxon word that pierces the mind like a spear and the simple figure that lights the understanding. He will never drive the judge to his dictionary. He will rejoice in the strength of the mother tongue as found in the King James version of the Bible, and in the power of the terse and flashing phrase of a Kipling or a Churchill.’  Hon. Robert H. Jackson4, U.S. Supreme Court

‘[A]void as much as possible stilted legal language, the thereins, thereofs, whereinbefores, hereinafters, and what-have-yous. Use English wherever you can to express the idea as well and as concisely as in law or Latin. A healthy respect for the robust Anglo-Saxon appeals more than does the Latin, whether or not it is Anglicized. The home-grown product in this case is better than the imported, not to say smuggled, one.’ Hon. Wiley B. Rutledge5, U.S. Supreme Court

‘Write so that you’re understood. English is a hard language to learn, but it’s an easy language to communicate in. There’s no reason to put Latin in your brief.’ Hon. Craig T. Enoch6, Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas

‘Don’t use legalese. It causes you to put your contentions in stale ways.’ Hon. Thomas Gibbs Gee7, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1974-91

‘Legalese is an impediment to clear, logical thinking.’ Hon. F. Lee Duggan8, First Court of Appeals, Houston

‘It’s easier for a judge when you’re using common usage. Judges are only human, after all.’ Hon. Carolyn Wright9, Family District Court, Dallas

Simplify, Simplify!

‘For a hundred years, good lawyers have been writing without all the garbage and in a simple, direct style.’ Hon. Lynn N. Hughes10. U.S. District Court, Houston

‘A lawyer should write the brief at a level a 12th grader could understand. That’s a good rule of thumb. It also aids the writer. Working hard to make a brief simple is extremely rewarding because it helps a lawyer to understand the issue. At the same time, it scores points with the court.’ Hon. William Bablitch11, Supreme Court of Wisconsin

‘When a judge finds a brief which sets up from twelve to twenty or thirty issues or ‘points’ or ‘assignments of error,’ he begins to look for the two or three, perhaps the one, of controlling force. Somebody has got lost in the underbrush and the judge has to get him—or the other fellow—out. That kind of brief may be labeled the ‘obfuscating’ type. It is distinctly not the kind to use if the attorney wishes calm, temperate, dispassionate reason to emanate from the cloister. I strongly advise against use of this type of brief, consciously or unconsciously. Though this fault has been called over-analysis, it is really a type of under-analysis.’ Hon. Wiley B. Rutledge12, U.S. Supreme Court

‘The key is to make the brief easy for the judge to follow.’ Hon. Lloyd Doggett13, Supreme Court of Texas

Cut the Verbiage

‘You want your brief to be as readable as possible . . . . If I pick up a brief of 49 and a half pages, it has a little less credibility than one that succinctly argues its points in 25 pages . . . . There’s nothing better to read than a well-written brief from a really good lawyer.’ Hon. Jerry E. Smith14, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

‘Eye fatigue and irritability set in well before page 50.’ Hon. Patricia M. Wald15, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

‘A brief should manifest conviction . . . . [That] is virtually impossible . . . if it contains an excessive number of quotations or is larded with numerous citations to the authorities. Short quotations sometimes clinch a point, but long ones fail in that objective.’ Hon. George Rossman16. Supreme Court of Oregon

‘Start in the very first sentence with the problem in this case. Put it right up front. Start early. Don’t bury it under a lot of verbiage and preliminaries.’ Hon. Nathan L. Hecht17, Supreme Court of Texas

Does Style Matter?

‘Style must be regarded as one of the principal tools of the judiciary and it thus deserves detailed attention and repeated emphasis.’ Hon. Griffin B. Bell18, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

‘Lawyers are excused from the necessity of interesting their readers, and all too often—let’s face the evidence—they take advantage of this enviable exemption.’ Hon. Jerome Frank19, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

‘Is good writing rewarded? I used to think it doesn’t matter much, in comparison with legal authority, justice, and the like. Now I know better: Good writing is rewarded so automatically that you don’t even think about it.’ Hon. Murry Cohen20, Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston

Bryan A. Garner (bagarner@att.net), president of Dallas-based LawProse, Inc. (www.lawprose.org), is the author of many books on writing, including Legal Writing in Plain English (2001) and The Elements of Legal Style (2d ed. 2002). He is also editor in chief of all current editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. He teaches at Southern Methodist University School of Law.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Witness Credibility When Witness Has A Criminal History.

08 Saturday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Colorado Supreme Court, Evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence, Jury Persuasion, Rule 609, Trial Tips and Techniques, Witnesses

≈ Comments Off on Witness Credibility When Witness Has A Criminal History.

Tags

Evidence, EvidenceProf Blog, Felony, Judge Sotomayor, Violence, Witness, Witness Credibility

Credibility Proxies: Violence, by JSK, Evidence ProfBlogger, EvidenceProf Blog

http://tinyurl.com/pr3nqtl

Yesterday [November 7, 2014], we saw the Colorado Supreme Court grappling with whether an act of shoplifting is admissible as evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility. In that same opinion, People v. Segovia, the C.S.C. noted that acts of violence have typically been excluded when offered to impeach credibility.

This frequently cited notion, that acts of violence are not particularly relevant to credibility, is worth interrogating further. To do so, I turn to another opinion from the past decade. This one is a frequently cited opinion by then Judge Sotomayor of the Second Circuit, U.S. v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606. The case was an appeal of the convictions of two men who were found to have conspired to sell cocaine and heroin. At trial, the government called cooperating witnesses. Defense counsel sought to impeach the two witnesses with evidence that between them they had burglary, larceny, felony drug and murder convictions. Acknowledging that F.R.E. 609(a)(1) suggest that felony convictions are presumptively relevant to credibility, the trial court held in camera hearings to probe into the nature of the larceny, felony drug and murder convictions.  It found that they weren’t especially probative of truthfulness. The court therefore ruled that defense counsel could not name the particular felonies committed or ask about the nature of the convictions, but instead could simply elicit the fact of the convictions and the dates.

The Second Circuit disagreed with the blanket prohibition on naming the felonies. It held that unless a conviction fails 403 balancing and is excluded entirely, ‘it is the jury’s function to assess the probative value of a witness’ specific conviction or convictions as part of its overall evaluation of the witness’s credibility.’ Judge Sotomayor wrote that the trial court must examine ‘which of a witness’s crimes have elements relevant to veracity and honesty and which do not’ because while all felonies are not equally probative of credibility ‘many are significantly probative of a witness’ propensity for truthfulness.’

Judge Sotomayor then offered a taste of how the trial court should go about making these determinations. And this is where it gets really interesting. With heavy reliance on earlier authority, she distinguished acts of violence from crimes that “reflect adversely on a person’s integrity.’ Crimes of violence ‘generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity’ because they result from provocation, carelessness, impatience or combativeness. By contrast, she explained, theft and escape crimes, which don’t fall under 609(a)(2), are nonetheless highly probative of credibility because they involve ‘deliberate and injurious violation of basic standards rather than impulse or anger, and usually . . . some element of deceiving the victim.’ In addition, the gravity and/or depravity involved in the offense should be considered both for their ability to prejudice the jury and because ‘particularly heinous crimes may be high in probative value insofar as they reflect a rejection of social mores.’

Once again, then, rejection of social mores and ‘violation of basic standards” are held up as clear indicators of lack of credibility. Strangely, though, crimes of violence seem to fit those definitions quite well. The very criminalization of such acts suggest that society demands that one maintain self-control and refrain from violence in most circumstances. A violent lack of inhibition or a deliberate indifference to the injuries caused by ones’ actions arguably run contrary to basic standards that glue society together just as fundamentally as the decision to steal from another person.

Even if, instead, lying is linked to the ability to scheme or plan, then this is not much more helpful as a way to distinguish crimes of violence. Certainly, many theft crimes may happen without much thought (shoplifting, for example) and they may be more excusable as the result of thoughtlessness than violence that causes bodily harm to another person. Why is it likely that someone who steals $100 on a whim is more prone to lying than someone who lashes out at another with a beer bottle during a brawl? Why isn’t it equally likely that people who are prone to fly into a violent rage at a perceived slight or recklessly injure others would be careless of the courtroom oath or think nothing of fabricating facts in order to protect themselves? Judge Sotomayor doesn’t answer these questions.

Ironically, even as she offered this fairly detailed explanation of how to weigh felonies under Rule 609(a)(1), Judge Sotomayor illustrated the subjectivity of such line drawing. Coming to the opposite conclusion of the Colorado Supreme Court, she found that it was not error for the district court to conclude that the circumstances of one of the witness’ shoplifting conviction did not ‘involve falsity or deceit such as to fall within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2).’ Her explanation: stealth and dishonesty are not the same thing.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

iPriviledge – Is It Legal To Be Forced To Use Your Fingerprint To Unlock Your iPhone?

05 Wednesday Nov 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Admissibility, Appellate Law, Apple, Cell Phones, Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, iPad, iPhones, Legal Technology, Passwords

≈ Comments Off on iPriviledge – Is It Legal To Be Forced To Use Your Fingerprint To Unlock Your iPhone?

Tags

Colin Miller, DNA Sample, EvidProf Blog, Fifth Amendment, Fingerprints, iPhone, iPriviledge, Password, Passwords, Touch ID

iPrivilege: Virginia Beach Judge Finds Prosecution Can Force Defendant To Supply Fingerprint To Unlock iPhone, by Evidence ProfBlogger, Editor Colin Miller, EvidProf Blogger

 http://tinyurl.com/lyvlk4o

In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment states that:

“No person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself….”

The Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment only covers “testimonial” evidence that results from compelled communicative acts, i.e., acts which disclose the content of one’s mind. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment does not cover a suspect’s act of appearing in a lineup or giving a blood sample to determine whether there are drugs in his system. The Fifth Amendment also does not cover the act of completing a handwriting exemplar. Imagine that the police find an alleged confession note written by the defendant. The prosecution can force the defendant to complete a handwriting exemplar in which the defendant writes a pre-printed paragraph in his handwriting so that a handwriting expert can compare the exemplar and the confession note. All of these and similar acts are not communicative because they are nontestimonial in that they do not force the defendant to disclose the contents of his mind.

What about if the defendant has encrypted files on his computer? Can the prosecution force the defendant to decrypt them? Some courts have said no. Other courts have said yes.

Can the prosecution force a defendant to supply his fingerprint to use for the TouchID on his iPhone? For the last year, I’ve used this article to teach my students that a judge could likely order a defendant to supply his fingerprint to unlock his iPhone. Recently, this possibility has become a reality.

According to an article in SlashGear:

[A] judge has ruled that you can be forced to relinquish your fingerprint to investigators seeking access to your device. The reason, says the judge, is that the fingerprint isn’t knowledge like a password, but is instead a physical object of sorts, like a key or a DNA sample.

The ruling was made recently by Virginia Beach Circuit Court Judge Steven Frucci, and was the result of a case against EMS captain David Baust, who was accused of attempted murder. The case’s prosecutors wanted access to Baust’s phone, believing that it might have a video of the alleged crime, but the defendant’s lawyer argued against this.

And, according to an article in the Huffington Post:

[I]t’s unclear how the ruling will impact Baust’s case. If his phone is protected by Touch ID, prosecutors could access it using Frucci’s ruling. If the phone is protected by a passcode or both a passcode and Touch ID, they can’t . . . .

One workaround to this issue could be to just turn off your phone if cops approach. In that case, you’d have to enter your four-digit pin when you turn it back on, even if you use Touch ID. . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Amicus Briefs From A Texas Supreme Court Judge’s Perspective.

30 Thursday Oct 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Amicus Briefs, Appellate Law, Appellate Writing, Brief Writing, Legal Writing

≈ Comments Off on Amicus Briefs From A Texas Supreme Court Judge’s Perspective.

Tags

Amicus Briefs, Appellate Law, Appellate Lawyer Blog, Chad Ruback, Don Cruse, Legal Writing, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett

Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett’s Thoughts on Amicus Briefs, by Chad Ruback, Appellate Lawyer Blog

http://tinyurl.com/m2mg7un

This afternoon, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett and Austin lawyer Don Cruse spoke at a continuing legal education seminar.  Among other things, they addressed amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court.

The court requests a response to the petition for review in about 33% of cases.  However, when an amicus brief has been filed prior to the time that the court decides whether to request a response, Mr. Cruse determined that the court requests a response about 85% of the time.  While only 2% of cases have amicus briefs filed prior to the time that the court decides whether to request a response, it seems that those petitions are disproportionately successful in getting a response requested.

The court requests briefs on the merits (a/k/a full briefing) in about 20% of cases.  However, when an amicus brief has been filed prior to the time that the court decides whether to request briefs on the merits, Mr. Cruse determined that the court requests briefs on the merits about 82% of the time.  While only 7% of cases have amicus briefs filed prior to the time that the court decides whether to request briefs on the merits, it seems that those petitions are disproportionately successful in getting briefs on the merits requested.

Consistent with this data, Justice Willett indicated that he enjoys reading amicus briefs and that it is advisable for a petitioner to have supporting amicus briefs filed early in the proceeding (e.g., before the court has decided to whether to request a response or at least before the court has decided whether to request briefs on the merits).

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Ignore Duty For Litigation Holds At Your Peril.

15 Wednesday Oct 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Discovery, E-Discovery, Employment Law, Litigation Hold, Preservation, Race Discrimination, Sanctions, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York

≈ Comments Off on Ignore Duty For Litigation Holds At Your Peril.

Tags

Andrew P. Sherrod, Discrimination, E-Discovery, EEOC, Employment Law, Evidence, Inside Counsel Magazine, Litigation Hold

Don’t Hit That Delete Button: An Update On Litigation Holds For Employment Claims, by Andrew P. Sherrod, Inside Counsel Magazine

http://tinyurl.com/ka6thgo

By now, most companies are — or at least should be — well aware of their obligation to preserve relevant documents and electronic information when they reasonably anticipate litigation. This duty can arise in many contexts, but employment complaints are a prime example. Despite the multitude of judicial decisions and articles on the subject, companies continue to hinder their defense of employment claims by failing to undertake appropriate preservation measures.

The consequences of failing to implement and monitor a litigation hold in response to an employment claim were reinforced in a recent decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Hawley v. Mphasis Corp.

In Hawley, an employee of the defendant company claimed that he was discriminated against on the basis of his ethnicity in a number of ways during the course of his employment. The employee filed an EEOC charge of race and national origin discrimination in September 2009. The company terminated the employee in November 2009, and he thereafter filed a second EEOC charge, which was mailed to the company in December 2009. The employee then filed a discrimination suit in January 2012 against the company under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state civil rights laws.

During his employment, the plaintiff received a company-issued laptop computer on which he was required to perform his work. After his termination, the employee returned the computer to the company in December 2009. The next month, the company reassigned the computer to another employee, permanently deleting all of the plaintiff’s data.

The company also waited until April 2012 — almost three months after the filing of the plaintiff employee’s lawsuit and more than two years after his EEOC charges — to instruct the plaintiff’s supervisor and several other employees to preserve all documents and communications related to the plaintiff. . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Hearsay Rule Affects Texas State-of-Mind Exception – Or Does It?

20 Saturday Sep 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, Evidence, Rule 803 Exception, Texas Supreme Court

≈ Comments Off on Hearsay Rule Affects Texas State-of-Mind Exception – Or Does It?

Tags

Cogdill v. State, Colin Miller, Evidence, Hearsay Rule, Murder Trial, Rule 803, State-of-Mind Exception

Back to the Future: Court of Appeals of Texas Finds State of Mind Exception Inapplicable in Duress Case, by Editor Colin Miller, Evidence ProfBlogger, EvidenceProf Blog

http://tinyurl.com/l2qfnap

Similar to its federal counterpart, Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides an exception to the rule of hearsay for:

A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.

As I always tell my students, Rule 803(3) covers statements concerning present feelings of future intentions but not past events. So where did that leave the defendant in Cogdill v. State, 2014 WL 4627579 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2014)?

In Cogdill, Nico Allen–Antoni Cogdill was charged with capital murder. At trial, Cogdill raised a duress defense, claiming that he and Isaac Milne killed the victim because Jeremy “Bounce” Bukowski threatened them with a shotgun. To prove this claim, Cogdill sought to have Bukowski’s cellmate testify that:

Mr. Bukowski told me that the night that—that all three of them, they went out to the—to the guy’s house. He said that—that at first he had told Mr. Cogdill and Mr. Isaac Milne that it was just to go out there to rob the guy of some laptops, some computer software, and some musical instruments and stuff. He said whenever they got there he said—he said the guy that they went to rob used to be an old roommate of his and said that he told them that the guy was a convicted pedophilier (sic), and whenever they got out there he pulled a shotgun from his trunk, he held it on Mr. Cogdill and Mr. Milne and forced them to proceed with the—with the murder.

Cogdill claimed that this statement was admissible under Rule 803(3), but the trial court disagreed. On appeal, Cogdill repeated his argument, but the Court of Appeals rejected his claim, concluding:

First, we disagree with Cogdill’s interpretation of Bukowski’s statement. The statements allegedly made by Bukowski are merely a rendition of the events that took place on the night of the murder, i.e., out-of-court statements of events that occurred, and as such are hearsay and not admissible under Rule 803(3). . . . Second, numerous courts have held that for the exception set forth in Rule 803(3) to apply, the statement must relate to future, not past, conduct.

I agree with the court’s conclusion but wonder whether Cogdill also raised Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24), which provides an exception to the rule against hearsay for :

A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In criminal cases, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

The opinion doesn’t reference this Rule, but threatening someone with a shotgun to kill someone would certainly qualify as a statement against interest under the Rule, assuming that there were corroborating circumstances. And, unlike its federal counterpart, Texas’ statement against interest rule does not require that the declatant be unavailable.

-CM

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

What Happens When No Written Notice Is Given To Offer An Exhibit?

30 Saturday Aug 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Admissibility, Appellate Law, Authentication, Court Rules, Court Rules, Courts, Evidence, Federal District Court Rules, Rule 803 Exception, Rule 902

≈ Comments Off on What Happens When No Written Notice Is Given To Offer An Exhibit?

Tags

Colin Miller, Court Record, EvidenceProf Blog, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(11), Second Circuit

Did You Notice That?: 2nd Circuit Excuses Lack of Written Notice Under Rule 902(11), by Evidence ProfBlogger, Editor: Colin Miller, EvidenceProf Blog

http://tinyurl.com/o98a788

The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person that complies with a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record — and must make the record and certification available for inspection — so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.

So, what happens if a party does not give reasonable written notice of its intent to offer a business record into evidence but there is evidence that the opposing party had actual notice of this intent? That was the question addressed by the Second Circuit in its recent opinion in United States v. Komasa, 2014 WL 4233396 (2nd Cir. 2014). . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Third Circuit Holds Evidence Rule 609 Excludes Admissibility of Prior Criminal Convictions.

24 Sunday Aug 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Admissibility, Appellate Law, Criminal Law, Evidence, Impeachment, Rule 609

≈ Comments Off on Third Circuit Holds Evidence Rule 609 Excludes Admissibility of Prior Criminal Convictions.

Tags

Criminal Convictions, Evidence, EvidenceProf Blog, Impeachment, Jeff Bellin, Rule 609, Witness Credibility

A Rare Federal Opinion that Gets, Really Gets, Rule 609, by Jeff Bellin, EvidenceProf Blog

http://tinyurl.com/lkrrmlw

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the admissibility of criminal convictions to impeach witness credibility.  In a 2008 article, I criticized how the federal courts apply this rule, arguing that because of a widely adopted, often misapplied, and partially incoherent multi-factor framework, courts were letting too many defendants’ convictions be used as impeachment.  As I argued, if courts simply jettisoned the framework and did what the rule commanded – weigh probative value against prejudicial effect – exclusion would become the norm as intended.  Apart from getting the law right, this would have an additional benefit of generating more defendant testimony.  (Defendants generally decline to testify once a judge rules that their record comes in if they do.)  I don’t know how anyone can get behind a system where the person the jury most wants to hear from and who wants to tell his story sits silently at counsel table to keep the jury from hearing about his criminal record.

My arguments made little headway over the years and defendants’ convictions continue to be routinely admitted, but recently the Third Circuit cited my piece (along with criticism of others) in what may be one of the first signs of judicial dissatisfaction with the multi-factored balancing test.  The court also used/endorsed language rarely seen in published opinions that, in my view, gets the tone of Rule 609 right.

Commentators have observed that structuring the balancing in this manner creates a ‘predisposition toward exclusion.’ Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6132, at 216.  ‘An exception is made only where the prosecution shows that the evidence makes a tangible contribution to the evaluation of credibility and that the usual high risk of unfair prejudice is not present.’ Id.  § 6132, at 217.

U.S. v. Caldwell, — F.3d — (3d Cir. 2014)

Expect to see this language in lots of defense filings going forward and join with me in hoping that the courts are finally awakening to the unmitigated disaster that is the multi-factored Rule 609 balancing test.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

Fifth Circuit Reiterates ERISA Standard of Review.

20 Wednesday Aug 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, ERISA

≈ Comments Off on Fifth Circuit Reiterates ERISA Standard of Review.

Tags

5th Circuit, ERISA, Louisiana Civil Appeals Blog, Raymond Ward, Standard of Review

ERISA Standard Of Review, by Raymond Ward, Louisiana Civil Appeals

http://tinyurl.com/mqhn2mq

In case anyone needed a reminder about the district court’s standard of review in an ERISA case, the U.S. Fifth Circuit recently drove the message home, with some harsh words for the district judge:

It apparently bears repeating here that district courts hearing complaints from disappointed ERISA plan members or their beneficiaries for the administrative denial of benefits are not sitting, as they usually are, as courts of first impression. Rather, they are serving in an appellate role. And, their latitude in that capacity is very narrowly restricted by ERISA and its regulations, as interpreted by the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, including the oft-repeated admonition to affirm the determination of the plan administrator unless it is “arbitrary” or is not supported by at least “substantial evidence”—even if that determination is not supported by a preponderance. We had thought that by now this was understood and accepted by all district judges of this circuit. But, as this case demonstrates that we were wrong, at least as to one of them, we try yet again to drive that message home.

McCorkle v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 13-30745, slip op. at 6–7 (5th Cir. July 3, 2014) (footnotes omitted, emphasis by the court). The opinion goes on to articulate the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applicable in ERISA cases. For anyone who practices in this area, it’s a must-read.

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

What It Means When Court Opinion’s Author Is “Per Curiam.”

17 Sunday Aug 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law

≈ Comments Off on What It Means When Court Opinion’s Author Is “Per Curiam.”

Tags

Appellate Court Opinions, Ira Robbins, Per Curiam, SCOTUS Blog

Scholarship Highlight: The Supreme Court’s Misuse Of Per Curiam Opinions, by Ira Robbins, SCOTUSblog

http://tinyurl.com/8d5qfr7

“Per Curiam” is a Latin phrase that means “by the court.” It is sometimes used to distinguish an opinion written by the entire court rather than one of the judges.

When I worked for a Justice at the Oklahoma Supreme Court, I saw only one “per curiam” opinion handed down by the Court.  Courts don’t decide appeals overnight. It usually takes a year or two before the Court renders an appeal. In this one unique situation, a case had languished for an inordinately long time. I will never know why the judge to whom the appeal had been assigned never got around to it.

To resolve the situation, the Chief Justice re-assigned the case to another judge, who made this particular appeal a priority. As quickly as possible, he wrote a draft opinion circulated to the rest of the court for consideration. When the opinion was adopted and handed down by the Court, the author written on the opinion itself said “per curiam.” The judge who actually wrote the opinion did not want to be unfairly criticized for the delay.

“Per curiam” can be used for other reasons. This post by Ira Robbins at SCOTUS Blog elaborates on the history, use, and misuse of this legal term of art. -CCE

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...

International Law: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

06 Wednesday Aug 2014

Posted by Celia C. Elwell, RP in Appellate Law, International Law, United Kingdom

≈ Comments Off on International Law: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

Tags

Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, Donna Sokol, Great Britain, In Custodia Legis, Law Library of Congress, Supreme Court, UK, United Kingdom

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, by  Donna Sokol, In Custodia Legis, Law Librarians of Congress

http://tinyurl.com/kyg8bwz

Yesterday we celebrated the fourth birthday of In Custodia Legis, and today we have reached another milestone: this is the 1,000th blog post that we’ve published!  We asked David S. Mao, the Law Librarian of Congress, to write the 1,000th post.  In it, he highlights some of the many different areas of interest for the Law Library of Congress, such as legal systems, courts, foreign law, and of course, our collection of current and historical legal materials.

On a trip to London in 2012, I walked past the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom located in Parliament Square. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to visit the Court, as it was Sunday and the building was closed. I was, however, able to take a picture of the front doors.

Earlier this summer, I visited London again. This time I made sure to visit Parliament Square on a weekday so I was able to visit the Court.

While the UK has a long history as a sovereign state, the Supreme Court is a very new entity in the UK. It was created by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, with the Justices of the Supreme Court sitting for the first time in October 2009. The Court hears civil appeals from all parts of the UK, and criminal appeals from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. I’ll leave it to Clare to explain the intricacies of the Court’s jurisdiction. . . .

Share this:

  • Print (Opens in new window) Print
  • Tweet
  • Email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
  • Share on Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • More
  • Share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
  • Share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram
Like Loading...
← Older posts
Newer posts →
Follow The Researching Paralegal on WordPress.com

Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Search

Sign In/Register

  • Create account
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com

Categories

Archives

  • June 2024
  • March 2022
  • January 2022
  • November 2021
  • October 2021
  • January 2021
  • November 2020
  • October 2020
  • September 2020
  • August 2020
  • June 2020
  • May 2020
  • April 2020
  • January 2020
  • December 2019
  • October 2019
  • August 2019
  • July 2019
  • May 2019
  • March 2019
  • January 2019
  • December 2018
  • November 2018
  • October 2018
  • September 2018
  • August 2018
  • July 2018
  • June 2018
  • May 2018
  • April 2018
  • March 2018
  • February 2018
  • December 2017
  • November 2017
  • October 2017
  • September 2017
  • August 2017
  • July 2017
  • June 2017
  • May 2017
  • April 2017
  • March 2017
  • February 2017
  • January 2017
  • December 2016
  • November 2016
  • October 2016
  • September 2016
  • August 2016
  • July 2016
  • June 2016
  • May 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • February 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • November 2015
  • October 2015
  • September 2015
  • August 2015
  • July 2015
  • June 2015
  • May 2015
  • April 2015
  • March 2015
  • February 2015
  • January 2015
  • December 2014
  • November 2014
  • October 2014
  • September 2014
  • August 2014
  • July 2014
  • June 2014
  • May 2014
  • April 2014
  • March 2014
  • February 2014
  • January 2014
  • December 2013
  • November 2013
  • October 2013

Recent Comments

lawyersonia's avatarlawyersonia on In Custodia Legis – Lega…
Eric Voigt's avatarEric Voigt on Top 20 Paralegal Blogs, Websit…
profvoigt's avatarprofvoigt on Research Guides in Focus – Mun…
Make Your PDF Docume… on Make Your PDF Document Edit-Pr…
madlaw291282999's avatarmadlaw291282999 on Using Hyperbole -Are You Riski…

Recent Comments

lawyersonia's avatarlawyersonia on In Custodia Legis – Lega…
Eric Voigt's avatarEric Voigt on Top 20 Paralegal Blogs, Websit…
profvoigt's avatarprofvoigt on Research Guides in Focus – Mun…
Make Your PDF Docume… on Make Your PDF Document Edit-Pr…
madlaw291282999's avatarmadlaw291282999 on Using Hyperbole -Are You Riski…
  • RSS - Posts
  • RSS - Comments

Blog at WordPress.com.

  • Subscribe Subscribed
    • The Researching Paralegal
    • Join 460 other subscribers
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • The Researching Paralegal
    • Subscribe Subscribed
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
 

Loading Comments...
 

You must be logged in to post a comment.

    %d